

# CHILD BRIDES IN RURAL INDIA

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This paper investigates the determinants of child marriage using a new data set from rural India. Specifically, we focus on an extreme form of child marriage-- that is, the marriage of girls under the age of ten. No other study to our knowledge has examined the factors influencing the likelihood of such early marriage. Our model estimates the relative importance of economic factors and social norms in determining the prevalence of child marriage. Our findings reveal that the probability of a girl becoming married before her 10th birthday is highly correlated with the prevalence of child marriage within her own caste and village, even after controlling for household and village characteristics. Surprisingly, economic variables--such as household income and relative poverty status-- do not significantly affect the likelihood of becoming a child bride.

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## 1. Introduction

For millions of girls in the developing world, the onset of puberty marks the end of childhood and the beginning of adult responsibilities, including marriage and motherhood. Child marriage—that is, marriage before the age of 18—remains common in many traditional societies, even in countries where it is illegal. Rates of child marriage vary widely but are highest in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa where as many as half of girls in some countries are married before their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday. The marriage of children—particularly girls under the age of 15 or 16—is widely viewed as a violation of basic human rights (UNICEF, 2001), (Jensen and Thornton, 2003). The right to “free and full” consent when marrying is recognised in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) as well as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women—but consent cannot be “free and full” when one of the intended partners is very immature. In most cases of child marriage, the girl being married has no choice in either the timing of her marriage or whom she marries.

Early marriage is associated with a number of social and economic disadvantages for girls. Typically, child marriage coincides with the termination of formal schooling and can lead to social isolation when girls are cut off from family and friends. Child marriage is often linked to premature pregnancy and childbearing. Indeed, “pregnancy-related deaths are the leading cause of mortality for 15-19 year old girls (married and unmarried) worldwide” (UNICEF, 2001). Research shows that young brides are more vulnerable to both sexual and domestic violence (UNICEF, 2005). Young brides tend to have less bargaining power within the household and may be viewed as the property of their husband. Divorce is rarely an option for these girls and those who do choose to run away from abusive marriages may be punished (or even killed) by their family.

While a great deal has been written on the adverse effects of child marriage, much less is known about why the practice persists in so many countries. In this paper, we focus on the determinants of child marriage in an extreme form—that is, the marriage of girls under the age of 10. Specifically, we investigate the relative importance of economic and social factors in determining the prevalence of child marriage. Our findings suggest that social factors play a larger role than economic factors in determining

whether a girl becomes married before her 10th birthday. We offer the hypothesis that parents feel the need to conform to social norms and, as a result, they adopt the behavior of other families in their caste who live in the same village.

To investigate the importance of social conformity on child marriage, we employ new data from a household survey designed by one of the authors and implemented in nine rural villages in western Rajasthan during 2004-5. These data are unusual because they contain detailed information on the families of young girls who are eligible for marriage or already married. To date, much of what is known about child marriage comes from household surveys—like the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS)—which collect information on the bride’s current household (her husband’s household) but not on the household and village where she was raised. Such data are useful for understanding the *consequences* of child marriage but not for modeling the determinants of child marriage. To do this, the researcher must have information on the girl’s natal household as well as her parents’ background because it her parents who typically decide the timing of her marriage. Our data contain such information. However, as girls ranging in age from 10 to 18 were interviewed and asked their marital status, we do not know the age of marriage for all girls in our sample.<sup>1</sup> For example, some girls may marry after the interview but before they turn 18. Therefore, we focus on the determinants of marriage before the age of 10. No other study to our knowledge has examined the factors underlying such young marriages.

Our empirical analysis reveals that social norms play an important role in explaining the prevalence of child marriage. Specifically, we find that the probability of a girl being married before her 10<sup>th</sup> birthday is highly correlated with the prevalence of early marriage within her own caste and village—whereas the cross-caste effects at the village level are insignificant. Caste and parental education are also important, but economic status, including family income, relative income, and land ownership, are

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<sup>1</sup>Our study uses the local definition of female adolescence (that is, girls aged 10 to 18 years of age).

surprisingly unimportant. Several checks are carried out to verify our results, including a number of specifications which attempt to deal with the “reflection problem” identified by Manski (1993a).

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material about the institution of marriage in India and relates this to the literature on social influence or conformity. Section 3 provides a brief explanation of the reduced form model that we estimate. Section 4 describes the data and empirical results. In Section 5, we offer some concluding remarks.

## **2. Background**

India is an interesting country in which to examine child marriage for several reasons. India has one of the highest rates of child marriage in the developing world. According to the latest National Family Health Survey (2005-6), 44.5 percent of women aged 20 to 24 were married before the age of 18 and, of these, 22.6 percent were married before the age of 16 (Rao et al, 2009). Given the sheer size of India’s population, this means that millions of girls are at risk of being married as children in the next decade if current trends continue.

Child marriage is illegal in India and has been illegal since The Child Marriage Restraint Act (CMRA) of 1929. Updates to this law established the minimum age of marriage at 18 years for girls and 21 years for boys. Under CMRA, child marriage is a crime which is punishable by either a fine or imprisonment of up to 3 months (Sagade, 2005). In practice, the law is rarely enforced because there is no nationwide system for the registration of marriages which makes it difficult to prove that marriages have taken place below the legal age. In addition, once a marriage is performed, it is legally valid even if the girl is underage. Given the illegality of child marriage, the questioning of girls on their marital status is a highly sensitive subject which may lead to inaccurate responses in survey data. We are fairly confident, however, about the accuracy of our data since the enumerators for our survey live in the same village as the respondent. Given the small size of these villages (and the celebratory nature of weddings

even when they are performed in secret), the marital status of those within the village is usually common knowledge.

To better understand the nature of marriage markets in India, it is useful to outline the basic structure of Indian marriages. Indian marriages usually take place within endogamous groups—that is, young people tend to marry only those who belong to the same caste. This preference for within-caste marriage is strong, even among middle-class Indians.<sup>2</sup> Banerjee et al (2009), for example, measure the strength of discriminatory preferences using a new data set on individuals who placed matrimonial advertisements in a major Bengali paper. They find that “parents of a prospective bride would be willing to trade off the distance between no education and a master’s degree to avoid marrying outside their caste”(p. 3). Similarly, Dugar et al (2008) reveal that “even a quadrupling of income is not enough to make up for a one-level caste difference between grooms” (p. 1).

Several other features of the Indian marriage market are important. First, marriages are arranged by parents and, when parents’ and children’s preferences are discordant, parental preferences dominate. A recent survey from Rajasthan reveals that most girls preferred to be married at an older age than their parents believed would be optimal for them (Santhya et al, 2006). It is the parents’ primary duty to get their daughter(s) married, and having an older unmarried daughter means a loss of social status as well as additional monetary costs to the family. Studies have shown the size of dowry payments to be positively correlated to the age of the bride, suggesting that it may be more expensive for parents to marry an older daughter (Chowdhury, 2010). Second, the Indian marriage market is patrilocal—that is, brides leave their parents’ home to live with their husbands. In the villages surveyed, grooms are always selected from outside the bride’s own village. Therefore, the proportion of child brides in a village does not imply anything about the supply of potential grooms.

Surprisingly, rates of child marriage in India have not fallen significantly, despite the country's recent growth boom and falling rates of poverty. According to Jensen and Thornton (2003), 57 per cent

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<sup>2</sup> Today hypergamy--attaining upward mobility through marriage-- is more common than it was in the past. See, for example, Srinivasan (2005). Such marriages usually require a large dowry.

of Indian women (aged 20 to 24) were married before their 18<sup>th</sup> birthday in 1975. Thirty years later, the rate of child marriage among the same age group of women had fallen by only 12.5 percent. The persistence of child marriage has puzzled policy makers since child marriage is usually thought to be associated with poverty. Indeed, the policy response by several regional governments has been to provide financial incentives to families who postpone their daughters' marriages.<sup>3</sup>

One possible reason for the slow decline in child marriage is that many aspects of individual behaviour—including marriage and fertility—are tightly regulated by social custom. When strong social norms are present in a society, individuals may be slow to change their behaviour. Indeed, many social customs—such as India's caste system—have persisted for generations despite the fact that a significant fraction of India's population would be better off if the custom disappeared. As Akerlof (1976, 1980) noted decades ago, many social customs that are costly to follow persist because individuals are unwilling to suffer the loss of reputation which would result from breaking with custom. In this paper, we examine the importance of social norms in explaining the variation in rates of child marriage across villages in rural India.

The term, 'social influence' has long been used in the sociological literature and more recently has become part of the economists' lexicon (Manski, 1993a), (Manski, 1993b), (Grinblatt et al, 2008), (Young, 2009). We define 'social influence' as the proportion of girls in a village who belong to the family's caste and were married before the age of 10.<sup>4</sup> This variable reflects the prevalence of child marriage at the village and caste level. If a large proportion of a family's caste marry their daughters at a young age, we assume that the family will feel some pressure to adhere to the social norm of the village. Following Manski (1993b), we consider 'social influence' to be an endogenous effect in that individual families have a propensity to behave in a way that corresponds to the behavior of others in their reference

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<sup>3</sup> According to UNICEF (2001, p. 15), “the governments of Rajasthan, Karnataka and Haryana have established an incentive programme for low-income families. In Haryana, for example, a small sum of money (Rs. 2,500 or approximately US\$78) is set aside in a savings account for a girl at birth. At the age of 18, if she is still unmarried, the girl is eligible to collect the accumulated sum of Rs. 25,000.”

<sup>4</sup> We do not include the girl herself when calculating the proportion of same-caste girls married before the age of 10.

group. Behaviour with respect to age of marriage of daughters is endogenous in the sense that any policy intervention that directly affects attitudes about child marriage in one or more families in the group would have a “social multiplier” effect throughout the reference group (Manski, 1993b, p. 533).

Our estimation strategy deals with the identification issue highlighted by Manski (1993a). That is, the prevalence of child marriage in the reference group (i.e., caste) could be a proxy for any unobserved determinant of early marriage at the household level, at least to the extent that it is correlated among households in a village. That is, ‘social influence’ could be picking up unobserved village effects. To address this potential problem, we employ an estimation strategy similar to that used by Munshi and Myaux (2006). Specifically, we assume that parents respond to the marriage norms of families within their own caste and village but not to the marriage norms of other castes within their village. For each household, we define the ‘other-caste’ effect as the proportion of girls who are members of other castes in the village and were married as child brides (i.e., before the age of 10). We expect this variable to be insignificant in all of our specifications. If the ‘other-caste’ effect is significant, there could be unobserved household effects influencing our results.

### **3. The Decision to Marry**

To estimate the determinants of child marriage, we assume that parents decide the timing of their daughter's marriage. By making this assumption, we introduce the classic agency problem-- that is, parents make decisions for their daughter(s) about when and whom to marry but they do not fully internalise the costs of those decisions. For example, if parents choose to arrange the marriage of a pre-adolescent girl without considering how such a marriage will affect her current or future well-being, they may select a lower age of marriage than would be chosen by the girl herself.

We assume that parental decisions are influenced by a number of factors which vary across both households and villages. These factors include the standard socio-economic variables as well as a ‘social influence’ variable. The inclusion of the ‘social influence’ variable captures the potential effect of

village-specific norms which relate to the custom of child marriage. We assume that parents feel pressure to conform to social norms but their willingness to conform varies across households. For example, 'social influence' is more likely to affect individuals when they have few information sources. In such circumstances, parents are likely to watch their neighbours' behaviour for signals on optimal behavior. That is, parents observe the marriage decisions of same-caste families in their village and consider this information when making decisions about the timing of their own daughter's marriage. We therefore predict that the probability of a girl becoming married before the age of 10 is positively correlated with the prevalence of child marriage among girls from the same caste in her village.

#### **4. Data Description and Empirical Results**

This study employs an original data set to investigate the role of both economic and social factors in determining the probability of child marriage. The data were obtained from a stratified, random sample of approximately 1000 households surveyed in nine rural villages in the Jodhpur district of Rajasthan during 2004 and 2005. The survey asked detailed questions about the status of adolescent daughters in the household, including questions on their age and marital status. In addition, information was collected on their parents and siblings. In households with more than one daughter, only one girl was interviewed. In most cases, this girl was the eldest daughter.<sup>5</sup>

Early marriage is common in rural Rajasthan. More than one-third of the girls in our sample are classified as either 'effectively' or 'contractually' married. Of those who are married, more than 70 percent were married before the age of 10. Girls are 'effectively married' if they have had a wedding ceremony whereas they are 'contractually married' if they are betrothed but have not yet had a wedding. It should be noted that marriage contracts, even among the very young, are considered irrevocable. Breaking a marriage contract can lead to a family's disgrace and may subject family members to violence.

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<sup>5</sup> If the family has daughters above the age of 18, they would not be interviewed. They would, however, be included in the calculation of the girl's number of sisters.

We therefore categorize girls as married if they are either ‘contractually’ or ‘effectively’ married. Many marriages are arranged during a girl's infancy or early childhood. It is customary for pre-pubescent, married girls to remain with their families until they are old enough to move into their husband's household.<sup>6</sup> The girls in our sample include single girls and married girls who live with their parents or married girls who maintain contact with their parents.

As revealed in Table 1, most girls in our sample come from households with low levels of education and income. Only seven per cent of the girls’ mothers, for example, are literate. This is lower than the national literacy rate for women in India which is estimated at 48 per cent (World Bank, 2008). The literacy gap for fathers is not as large. Fifty-six percent of the girls’ fathers are literate while the national average for men is estimated at 73 per cent (World Bank, 2008). The average monthly income for households in our sample is 3,020 rupees which is equivalent to about two dollars per day at the time of the survey. The rate of land-ownership, however, is very high (86% of households) and most families engage in some form of agricultural activities.

In these villages, there are four main Hindu caste groupings: three lower castes and one high caste. The three lower castes, scheduled castes (dalits), scheduled tribes, and other backward castes (OBC), are recipients of affirmative action by the Indian government. The girls in our sample who are defined as OBC are predominantly and almost exclusively members of the Vishnoi caste. High-caste (general caste) girls are virtually all members of the Rajput caste. All households in the sample are either Hindu or Muslim, with Hindu being the dominant religious group (97% of the sample). The Muslim families are quite assimilated into the community and were categorized as general caste by the interviewers. To check that religion is not a confounding factor, empirical tests were conducted which

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<sup>6</sup> Parents are often able to delay transferring a daughter to the husband’s household as long as she remains in school.

excluded the one village in which Muslim households were a dominant group.<sup>7</sup> This exclusion entailed no significant changes to our empirical results.

To determine the factors which increase the likelihood of becoming a child bride, we estimate several different probits. Covariates include caste, parental education, number of siblings, and household economic status. We define educational attainment in terms of literacy rather than years of schooling because many adults, particularly women, attain literacy through informal methods of schooling. In addition, we include the number of brothers and sisters as separate covariates because parental decisions about the timing of a daughter's marriage are likely to be affected by both the number and gender of siblings. We also include the girl's age (and its square) to capture any possible cohort effects.

Several variables are included which control for different aspects of economic status. These include household income (measured by the head of household's monthly income), relative income (measured by a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the household's monthly income is below the mean income in the village), land-ownership (measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the family owns land), and electricity (measured by a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the home has electricity).

Table 2 presents the results of the probit analysis. In column (1) we include only the 'social influence' and 'other-caste' effect as covariates. As predicted, the 'social influence' coefficient (marginal effect) is positive and significant but the 'other-caste' coefficient is not significant. The positive coefficient of the social influence variable indicates that the probability of a girl becoming married before age 10 increases as the proportion of child brides from her own caste and village rises. In column (2), we add covariates which control for income, parental education, number of brothers and sisters, land-ownership, electricity, and the age and age squared of the girl. The addition of these variables only slightly raises the explanatory power of the equation (the pseudo  $R^2$  increases from 0.09 to 0.12).

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<sup>7</sup> There was a concern that Muslim households are outliers in that there is no pre-adolescent marriage of daughters but lower average income and lower female literacy rates than in Hindu households in the survey.

However, the magnitude and level of significance of the ‘social influence’ effect remains virtually unchanged. In this specification, the marginal effect of having a literate mother is highly significant and associated with a reduction of about 13 per cent in the probability of her daughter being married before age 10. Perhaps most surprising, neither of the income variables are statistically significant.

Only ‘electricity’ and ‘owns land’ are significant and the latter is only marginally significant. Having electricity in the home reduces the probability of a girl being a child bride by eight per cent whereas being in a land-owning family increases the probability by about the same amount. These two variables are likely to have social as well as economic dimensions. Land-ownership may be a proxy for higher social status which may facilitate earlier marriage if it is correlated with membership in a group with socially conservative attitudes. Having electricity may be associated with access to media sources (e.g., radio and TV) which provide information about attitudes outside the local village. Recently, Jensen and Oster (2009) have highlighted the importance of cable television in exposing rural households in India to new information. They find that the introduction of cable television is associated with a significant decrease in domestic violence toward women, as well as lower fertility and increased school enrollment.

In column (3) we add caste fixed effects to the model. Once we control for caste, the effect of ‘social influence’ is still significant but the (marginal) coefficient is reduced from 0.72 to 0.43. This is not surprising; it reflects the fact that social norms which operate via the caste system have an independent effect on child marriage. The ‘social influence’ effect is, however, still large enough to be of practical import. For instance, if the proportion of child brides within her caste and village were to be cut in half, the probability of a girl becoming married before age 10 would decline by about 20 percent. Column (3) also reveals that high-caste girls are less likely to be child brides than girls who are members of OBC, which is the omitted category. Girls in the other low castes are not significantly different from members of OBC in this respect. The addition of caste fixed effects also reduces the significance of mother’s literacy, indicating that mother’s literacy is probably correlated with higher caste status.

One cause for concern is that the lack of statistical significance of the income variables may be due to insufficient variation. In Table 3, we report average household income and its standard deviation by village which indicates substantial variation both across and within villages. Average monthly household income for the whole sample is about 3000 rupees with a standard deviation of about 1940 rupees. It is possible, of course, that the insignificance of the income variables is due to an ambiguous effect of income on age of marriage. Higher income may reduce the age of marriage if households with higher incomes are better able to finance a dowry or wedding when their daughters are young. On the other hand, higher income may increase the age of marriage if the cost of maintaining at daughter at home is more easily borne by more affluent families.

Another potential cause for concern is that 'social influence' may be correlated with income. To address this issue, we first estimate a model in which we omit all covariates except the income variables. We then add sequentially, family characteristics, caste fixed effects, and village fixed effects. In all specifications, the 'social influence' variable and the 'other-caste' variable are omitted. These results, reported in Table 4, show income to be insignificant in all specifications.

Finally, we examine whether the insignificance of the 'other-caste' variable arises because of insufficient variation of the caste variables at the village level. Inspection of the data suggests that this is not the case. Table 5 shows the distribution of castes within each village, and it appears that no caste is dominant in any single village. A more formal test consists of partitioning the sample by caste and then re-estimating the model for each caste separately. Unfortunately, we are limited by the small sample size of two of the castes.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, we estimate separate probits for girls belonging to the two largest castes which we refer to as 'low caste' and 'high caste'. The low-caste (OBC) sample comprises 42 percent of the girls whereas the high-caste (general-caste) sample comprises 26 percent.

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<sup>8</sup> There are 55 girls in the scheduled tribe sample and 145 girls in the scheduled caste sample.

Some important differences emerge when we subdivide the sample into low- and high-caste households. Referring back to Table 1, the rate of child marriage is much higher among low-caste girls than it is among high-caste girls. Thirty-seven per cent of girls in the low-caste sample were married before the age of 10 whereas the rate was only about six per cent for high-caste girls. Similarly, fewer low-caste mothers are literate. Only five per cent of low-caste mothers are literate compared with more than 15 per cent of high-caste mothers. However, the difference in economic status is less pronounced. Average monthly income of high-caste households is 3,431 rupees as compared to 3,208 for OBC households. Both groups have high rates of land-ownership, although electricity is more common in high-caste households (68%) than it is in OBC households (56%).

In Table 6, we present the results of the analysis on the partitioned sample. The results from the ‘low-caste’ sample are as expected. As seen in column (4), the ‘social influence’ effect is positive and significant while the ‘other-caste’ effect is insignificant. ‘Electricity’ has a significant negative effect as it does in the full sample. Less supportive results are found, however, when we estimate the probit equation using the ‘high-caste’ sample. Results shown in column (5) indicate that neither the ‘social influence’ nor the ‘other-caste’ effects are significant for ‘high-caste’ girls. In addition, none of the variables which are significant in the other specifications are significant in this specification. A likely explanation for the lack of significance of the ‘social influence’ variable is that it does not have the same effect among high caste families where the incidence of child marriage is low and therefore not the norm.

To better understand how parental education affects the decision making process, we examine the sub-sample of girls with literate fathers. Ideally we would also like to examine the behaviour of families with literate mothers but the sample is too small. The results for the sample with literate fathers are presented in Table 7. The ‘social influence’ effect remains significant, indicating that even families with literate fathers use informal information networks based on local norms when making marriage decisions. For this sub-sample, the effect of ‘literate mother’ is negative, highly significant, and of greater magnitude than in the whole sample, even when caste fixed effects are included. Having a literate mother

is associated with about a 16 percent reduction in the probability of a girl being a child bride. This result suggests that mother's literacy plays an important role in reducing child marriage in households where the father is literate as well. In addition, the effect of 'high-caste' is again negative, highly significant and of approximately the same magnitude as having a literate mother. Unique to this sub-sample, the coefficients of both 'age' and 'age squared' are significant, with younger girls being less likely to be child brides. One possible explanation for this apparent cohort effect might be that literate parents have responded to the Indian government's campaign in recent years against child marriage by changing their behaviour.

## **5. Conclusion**

In this paper, we examine the relative importance of economic and social factors in determining the probability of a girl in rural Rajasthan becoming a child bride. Our empirical results reveal that social conformity plays an important role in explaining the prevalence of child marriage in this part of India. Surprisingly, the data reveal that economic variables--such as household income, relative poverty status, and land ownership-- do not significantly affect the probability of a girl becoming married before her 10<sup>th</sup> birthday. This result is unexpected since child marriage is usually viewed as a by-product of extreme poverty.

One interpretation of our findings is that parents interpret the behaviour of others in their social group as an informational signal when making marriage decisions for their own daughters. This interpretation is reinforced by our finding that having electricity in the home reduces the likelihood of child marriage in all but high-caste families and households with literate fathers. This result suggests that providing access to information about social norms outside a family's own village may be an effective way of reducing child marriage in relatively isolated rural settings.

One additional result we found is that mother's literacy lowers the probability of a girl becoming a child bride in families where the father is also literate. Future research is needed, however, to fully understand the relationship between parental education, economic incentives, and parental decisions

regarding child marriage. Our results suggest that some combination of educational programs and economic incentives aimed at whole villages may be a more effective public policy strategy than the current practice of governments providing monetary incentives to individual families.

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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics of Full and Partitioned Samples

Variables	Full Sample (N=811)		High Caste (N=210)		OBC (N=389)	
	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean	Std. Dev.
Married < 10 years old	0.264	0.441	0.057	0.232	0.365	0.482
Effectively Married	0.335	0.472	0.133	0.341	0.400	0.491
Contractually Married	0.040	0.198	0.014	0.119	0.005	0.218
Unmarried	0.625	0.484	0.857	0.351	0.546	0.498
Father Literate	0.557	0.497	0.590	0.493	0.553	0.498
Mother Literate	0.069	0.025	0.148	0.356	0.046	0.210
Age of Girl	13.15	2.28	13.6	2.31	13.0	2.24
Number of Brothers	2.19	1.12	2.15	1.17	2.11	1.06
Number of Sisters	2.55	1.50	2.56	1.51	2.52	1.48
Monthly HH Income <sup>1</sup>	3,020	1,942	3,431	2,290	3,208	1,851
Owns Land	0.856	0.352	0.814	0.390	0.870	0.336
Income < Village Mean	0.692	0.460	0.619	0.487	0.900	0.301
Electricity	0.567	0.496	0.681	0.467	0.558	0.497
Scheduled Caste	0.186	0.390	0	0	0	0
Scheduled Tribe	0.075	0.264	0	0	0	0
Other Backward Castes	0.482	0.500	0	0	1	1
High Caste	0.259	0.438	1	1	0	0
Own-caste-own village	0.265	0.184	0.055	0.047	0.365	0.157
Other-caste-own-village	0.244	0.123	0.319	0.135	0.200	0.081

Note: Based on data collected by the authors. <sup>1</sup>Household monthly income in 1000s of rupees.

Table 2  
Probit Results on Child Marriage for Full Sample

Independent Variables	(1) All Girls		(2) All Girls		(3) All Girls	
	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error
Social influence effect	0.753**	(0.088)	0.720**	(0.090)	0.429**	(0.112)
Other-caste effect	-0.056	(0.135)	-0.047	(0.136)	0.177	(0.430)
Father literate			-0.175	(0.101)	-0.050	(0.029)
Mother literate			-0.507**	(0.229)	-0.098	(0.055)
No. of Brothers			0.013	(0.014)	0.015	(0.014)
No. of Sisters			-0.009	(0.011)	-0.009	(0.010)
Monthly income <sup>1</sup>			0.009	(0.012)	0.010	(0.012)
Income < mean <sup>2</sup>			-0.025	(0.164)	-0.008	(0.167)
Owens land			0.287	(0.161)	0.070	(0.041)
Electricity			-0.300**	(0.109)	-0.070*	(0.032)
Age			0.114	(0.081)	0.117	(0.075)
Age Squared			-0.00	(0.003)	-0.004	(0.003)
High caste					-0.208**	(0.043)
Scheduled Caste					-0.045	(0.037)
Scheduled Tribe					-0.042	(0.053)
No. of observations		811		811		811
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.089		0.117		0.135

Note: The dependent variable is one = girl is married at age<10. The social influence effect is the proportion of same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age<10. The omitted caste is OBC. <sup>1</sup>Income is monthly household income in 1000 rupees.. <sup>2</sup>Household income less than the village mean. All probits include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 1% and 5% are indicated by \*\* and \*, respectively.

Table 3  
Avg. Monthly Household Income and Proportion of Land-Owning Households by Village

Village #	Avg. Monthly Income in Rupees	Std. Dev.	Prop. Land Owners	Std. Dev.
1	4510	2511	0.892	0.325
2	3695	1868	0.938	0.244
3	2882	1878	0.873	0.334
4	2385	936	0.548	0.500
5	3308	2423	0.896	0.307
6	2207	1160	0.545	0.504
7	2924	1788	0.974	0.159
8	3038	1899	0.973	0.164
9	1854	1255	0.708	0.464

Table 4: Alternative Specifications: Determinants of Child Marriage

Independent Variables	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error
Monthly income <sup>1</sup>	-0.004	(0.013)	0.008	(0.013)	0.009	(0.013)	0.008	(0.012)
Income < Mean	-0.002	(0.054)	0.007	(0.053)	0.009	(0.051)	-0.015	(0.051)
Father literate			-0.066*	(0.032)	-0.056	(0.030)	-0.050	(0.031)
Mother literate			-0.157**	(0.046)	-0.094	(0.058)	-0.098	(0.057)
No. of Brothers			0.005	(0.014)	0.012	(0.013)	0.014	(0.013)
No. of Sisters			-0.010	(0.010)	-0.009	(0.010)	-0.010	(0.010)
Owns land			0.122**	(0.037)	0.087*	(0.039)	0.076	(0.043)
Electricity			-0.100**	(0.033)	-0.071*	(0.032)	-0.088**	(0.032)
Age			0.140	(0.078)	0.148	(0.076)	0.106	(0.076)
Age Squared			-0.005	(0.003)	-0.005	(0.003)	-0.003	(0.003)
High caste					-0.282**	(0.026)	-0.268**	(0.028)
Scheduled caste					-0.062	(0.035)	-0.057	(0.035)
Scheduled tribe					-0.082	(0.047)	-0.055	(0.050)
Village 1							-0.014**	(0.049)
Village 2							-0.202**	(0.037)
Village 4							-0.079	(0.050)
Village 5							0.042	(0.055)
Village 6							-0.173**	(0.056)
Village 7							-0.066	(0.043)
Village 8							-0.061	(0.048)
Village 9							-0.235**	(0.040)
Observations		811		811		811		811
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>		0.000		0.039		0.116		0.157

Note: Dependent variable = 1 if girl married at age < 10. Robust standard errors in ( ). <sup>1</sup> income in 1000 rupees.

Table 5  
Proportion of Child Brides and Caste Membership by Village

Village #	Sample Size	% Married < age 10	Std. Dev.	Scheduled Caste #	Scheduled Tribe #	OBC #	High Caste #
1	51	0.176	0.315	6	1	26	18
2	80	0.113	0.318	7	11	39	23
3	158	0.278	0.450	25	13	49	71
4	93	0.226	0.420	37	6	34	16
5	96	0.479	0.502	19	7	62	8
6	44	0.068	0.255	9	2	4	29
7	155	0.316	0.466	27	3	106	19
8	110	0.291	0.456	17	14	63	16
9	24	0.042	0.304	4	4	6	10
Total	811	0.254	0.441	151	61	389	210

Table 6  
Probit Results For Sample Partitioned into Low and High Caste

Independent Variables	(1) Low Caste (OBC)		(2) High Caste (General Caste)	
	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error
Social influence effect	0.792**	(0.170)	-0.326	(0.246)
Other-caste effect	0.234	(0.332)	0.069	(0.068)
Father literate	-0.060	(0.047)	-0.013	(0.028)
Mother literate	-0.100	(0.099)	-0.009	(0.035)
Number of Brothers	0.035	(0.024)	0.019*	(0.009)
Number of Sisters	0.009	(0.018)	-0.022**	(0.008)
Income/month (1000 Rs)	0.007	(0.020)	-0.001	(0.005)
Income < village mean	-0.018	(0.072)	0.014	(0.037)
Owns land	0.124	(0.072)	0.050	(0.029)
Electricity	-0.110*	(0.049)	-0.017	(0.028)
Age	0.098	(0.129)	0.294	(0.735)
Age Squared	-0.003	(0.005)	-0.009	(0.025)
No. of observations		389		210
Pseudo $R^2$		0.089		0.229

Note: The dependent variable is one = girl was married at age < 10. The social influence effect is the proportion of same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age < 10. All probits include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 1% and 5% are indicated by \*\* and \*, respectively.

Table 7  
 Probit Results For Subsample with Literate Fathers

Independent Variables	(1)	
	$\frac{\delta M}{\delta X}$	Std. Error
Social influence effect	0.347*	(0.141)
Other-caste effect	-0.157	(0.200)
Mother literate	-0.162**	(0.054)
Number of Brothers	0.107	(0.068)
Number of Sisters	0.004	(0.040)
Income/month (1000 Rs)	0.015	(0.015)
Income < village mean	-0.032	(0.063)
Owens land	-0.002	(0.059)
Electricity	-0.041	(0.042)
Age	0.260*	(0.107)
Age Squared	-0.009*	(0.004)
High caste	-0.159*	(0.059)
Scheduled caste	-0.047	(0.047)
Scheduled tribe	-0.059	(0.064)
No. of observations		452
Pseudo $R^2$		0.112

*Note:* The dependent variable is one = girl was married at age < 10. The social influence effect is the proportion of same-caste girls in own village (minus oneself) married at age < 10. The omitted caste is OBC. All probits include a constant. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 1% and 5% are indicated by \*\* and \*, respectively.

